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DOES ANXIETY EXPLAIN HEREDITARY SIN? 
Gregory R. Beabout 
This paper aims to complement Philip Quinn's article "Does Anxiety Explain 
Original Sin?" Quinn showed how Kierkegaard uses the concept of anxiety 
to provide a more adequate account of the origin of evil in human life. By 
focusing on chapter two of The Concept of Anxiety, this paper shows how 
Kierkegaard also uses the concept of anxiety to explain in what sense the 
sinfulness of previous generations can be a conditioning factor that influences 
the fall from innocence without compromising human freedom. 
I 
In his article "Does Anxiety Explain Original Sin?" Philip Quinn provides a 
helpful framework to understand Kierkegaard's difficult work The Concept 
of Anxiety. t Quinn argues that Kierkegaard follows Kant and Schleiermacher 
in rejecting, at least in part, the Augustinian conception of original sin. 
Augustine's view is notoriously problematic as an explanation of the origin 
of evil in human beings, since it implicitly makes the individual responsible 
for sins that one did not commit. Quinn sees Kierkegaard's use of the concept 
of anxiety as an advance in rethinking the Augustinian interpretation of origi-
nal sin, one that provides a more adequate account of the origin of evil in 
human life. 
In order to explain how Kierkegaard uses the concept of anxiety to explain 
original sin, Quinn first sets forth the views of Kant and Schleiermacher on 
this issue. Quinn concludes that Kierkegaard's use of the concept of anxiety 
is an advance not only on Augustine, but on Kant and Schleiermacher as well. 
These two recognized the inherent flaw in the Augustinian idea of original 
sin, but each are left with problems of their own. Kant so overemphasizes 
individual choice that he is left with an ahistorical, noumenal act carried out 
in a social vacuum. Schleiermacher is left with an implicit determinism when 
he claims that humans have an innate disposition towards sinfulness. Quinn 
concludes that Kierkegaard's use of the concept of anxiety "comes closer than 
either Kant or Schleiermacher to outlining a replacement that is adequate in 
both substance and emphasis."2 
While Quinn's account helps answer the question of his title, I will show 
that his explanation does not go as far as Kierkegaard's. QUinn's question is 
"Does anxiety explain original sin? But Kierkegaard writes of hereditary sin, 
not original sin. In the subtitle to The Concept of Anxiety, and throughout 
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most of the book, Kierkegaard uses the Danish term Arvesynd, which is better 
translated as "hereditary sin" than as "original sin," since the root "arv" 
means inheritance, heritage, or legacy. So Kierkegaard uses the concept of 
anxiety to shed light not only on the "origin" of sin, but on its "hereditariness" 
as well. 3 
The Christian tradition, through Augustine and also in the scriptures, 
teaches that Adam's sin is both original and hereditary. The Genesis account 
makes it clear that not only is the fall in Eden first, and hence original, but 
it has an effect on all subsequent humans, and is hence hereditary.4 St. Paul 
makes this clear in the fifth chapter of his letter to the Romans. So for a 
Christian explanation of the origin of evil in human life, we need an account 
of both the origin and hereditariness of sin. 
In Quinn's essay, the focus is on the question whether anxiety explains 
original sin. I want to complement his interpretation and analysis of 
Kierkegaard's work by focusing on the question of heredity: "Does anxiety 
explain hereditary sin?" I will do this by providing a more detailed interpre-
tation of chapter two of The Concept of Anxiety than the brief sketch set forth 
in Quinn's article. By focusing on chapter two and the issue of hereditariness, 
I will move the discussion beyond an explanation of original sin to an expla-
nation of the sense in which the sinfulness of previous generations can play 
a conditioning factor that influences the fall from innocence without compro-
mising human freedom. I will conclude that Kierkegaard successfully uses 
the concept of anxiety not only to explain the origin of evil in human life, 
but to explain its hereditariness as well. 
II 
The question of the hereditariness of sin causes special and difficult problems 
for thinking Christians. The very concept of sin entails within it the notion 
of free choice.s For if sin is caused by God, or the serpent, or any being other 
than the individual, then it is not really the responsibility of the individual, 
and not really sin.6 And if sin originates with Adam and is causally hereditary, 
then subsequent individuals are not really responsible for their sins; Adam 
is. 
Kierkegaard makes it clear that sin is not the fault of God, but is a choice 
made in anxiety by Adam, a choice that is mirrored by the first sinful choice 
of each human being. Hence anxiety explains original sin by making it clear 
that sin originates with human beings, and that anxiety is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for sin. 
This is explained by Vigilius Haufniensis, Kierkegaard's pseudonym, in 
chapter one of The Concept of Anxiety. Anxiety is a psychological (and even 
ontological) state of simultaneous attraction and repulsion to future possibili-
ties. In innocence, Adam is both attracted to and repulsed from the future 
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possibility of sin. That Adam sins is the result of his own choice, a choice 
made in anxiety. Anxiety then serves to explain sin as the condition for the 
possibility of the fall. As such, anxiety explains original sin only insofar as 
it is the psychological state of the individual prior to the first sin. Psychology 
is unable to provide a causal explanation of the fall, since sin is a free act 
incapable of a complete causal explanation. Hence, chapter one of The Con-
cept of Anxiety is not an attempt to give a causal explanation of original sin. 
Rather, it seeks through a transcendental explanation to understand the origin 
of sin in human beings by psychologically examining anxiety, which is the 
state that precedes but does not necessitate the first sin. 
In sum, Vigilius sets forth the following points in chapter one. Adam is 
essentially similar to every person. Sin entered into Adam through Adam's 
own sin. Particular sins are causally inexplicable. Adam is a prototype of a 
sinner, not the cause of sin in any other person. Sin enters in every other 
person through that person's own sin. Given these conclusions, the traditional 
paradox of original sin has been resolved. Individual are not guilty for a sin 
they did not commit, for example, Adam's original sin. Instead, every indi-
vidual who has sinned is guilty only of his or her own sin. 
III 
The issue might become clearer if we contrast it with a typical misunder-
standing of Kierkegaard's view on guilt and hereditary sin. Some commen-
tators have made sense of Kierkegaard's discussion of these topics by 
referring to Sf,')ren's father, Michael Pederson Kierkegaard. The story is told 
that the father, while eleven years old, was tending his flocks on the Jutland 
heath. He was alone, wet, cold, and hungry. He raised his eyes to the gray 
heavens and cursed God for making an innocent child suffer. Apparently 
afterward he felt tremendously guilty for this act and thought that he and all 
his offspring would be damned for this sin.7 
Moreover, the father must have also felt tremendous gUilt regarding Sf,')ren's 
mother. Michael Pederson Kierkegaard married Kirstine Royen, his social 
equal, in 1794. Two years later she died without having had any children. 
Before the year was over and while he still should have been mourning the 
death of his wife, his maid (Sf,')ren's mother to be) became pregnant. Based 
on the birth date of the child, she must have conceived in December of 1796. 
The father probably found out that his maid was pregnant in January or 
February of 1797. In February of that year, he retired from business and took 
up the study of pietistic theology. We can only imagine the guilt and confusion 
that the father must have experienced, for within two months, he quickly 
married his maid, in April. Five months after the marriage, a daughter was 
born. During this time, the father immersed himself in reading pietistic the-
ology. He saw himself and his offspring as guilty for his sins.8 (Sf,')ren was 
the youngest of seven children born from this second marriage.) 
120 Faith and Philosophy 
SjI)ren Kierkegaard may have been strongly influenced by his father, but he 
apparently did not hold the same view as his father on hereditary sin. His 
father seemed to hold that sin is passed on from generation to generation, 
that sin is literally and causally hereditary, an inheritance, a legacy. Vigilius, 
in chapter one, rejects that view. If subsequent individuals are not guilty of 
Adam's sins, then neither are Michael Pederson Kierkegaard's children guilty 
of his sins. Hence if, as some commentators have urged9 , Kierkegaard's 
writing is somehow a dialogue with his parents or his father, then The Concept 
of Anxiety is a rejection of his father's view that the children are guilty for 
the sins of the father. Of course, it does not follow from this that SlIlren 
Kierkegaard is declaring himself innocent. To be sure, Kierkegaard recog-
nized himself as guilty and as a sinner. However, if he is to embrace the view 
that he has Vigilius set forth in The Concept of Anxiety, then he is guilty for 
his own sins-not the sin of Adam, and not the sins of his father. 
Still, it is not completely satisfactory to view chapter one of The Concept 
of Anxiety simply as a rejection of his father's views on the "hereditariness" 
of original sin. Rather, the view that Vigilius sets forth is a reinterpretation 
of an entire tradition of understanding sin as hereditary, a tradition which 
goes back to Luther, Augustine, and St. Paul. 
Given this, we can more fully understand Quinn's point about how 
Vigilius's view of original sin is a radical rethinking, one that virtually puts 
the Augustinian interpretation to rest. Vigilius has reframed the entire issue 
of original sin. According to Vigilius, the individual does not participate in 
original sin through one's relation to Adam. Most prior explanations of origi-
nal sin sought to explain the sins of subsequent individuals through their 
relation to Adam. Vigilius holds that the individual participates in original 
sin through a relation to sin. Having sinned, one has participated in original 
sin through an experience essentially similar to Adam's first sin. 
IV 
The problem that Vigilius now faces is explaining in what sense original sin 
is hereditary. For in chapter one, Vigilius has dissolved the traditional di-
lemma that arises with the Western Christian notion of original sin, namely, 
blaming people for a sin they did not commit. However, he has created a new 
problem. His new problem is primarily a theological issue, for traditional 
Christian theology claims that Adam's sin is significant not only for Adam, 
but also for all humans. Still, a philosophical issue is involved. Is each 
individual completely in isolation from every other individual, or do indi-
viduals affect one another and if so to what extent? In chapter two, Vigilius 
takes up the task of showing the sense in which Adam's sin quantitatively 
changes the situation that all subsequent individual face, without necessitat-
ing that we become sinners. In so doing, he guards against the charge of 
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radical individualism without sacrificing either freedom of choice or personal 
responsibility for one's acts. 
Adam's sin has several effects. Sin now enters into the world through Adam 
becoming a sinner. This does not obliterate anxiety, for the person in sin still 
has an ambiguous relation to the future possibility of either sinning again or 
being redeemed. Hence, anxiety keeps its basic structure of both attraction 
to and repulsion from future possibilities, but there is a change in anxiety 
since there is an important change in the relevant future possibilities. 
Vigilius refuses to claim that one of the causal effects of Adam's first sin 
is the sinfulness of the rest of the human race. Instead, the two main effects 
are that Adam's sin changes the world and that Adam's sin changes the 
intensity of the desire that subsequent innocent individuals experience. 
Vigilius terms these objective and subjective anxiety. 
v 
The section on objective anxiety is initially very perplexing. Vincent 
McCarthy claims it is the weakest section in the book; he assumes that it is 
taken up only so there will be some contrast for the following section on 
subjective anxiety.lo McCarthy does not make it clear that in this section 
Vigilius is trying to make sense of the "hereditariness" of sin. In chapter one, 
the view that sin is strictly hereditary, that is, that it causes a flaw in the being 
of subsequent individuals, is rejected. In this section, Vigilius discusses the 
way sin and anxiety enter into the social context and the historical nexus and 
hence become objectified. l1 Haufniensis recognizes that, after Adam, indi-
viduals are not born into an environment in which sin is absent. Rather, 
innocent individuals are born into a world with parents who are themselves 
sinners, with distorted social structures, and in specific historical situations 
that are more or less complicated by wrongdoing. In this sense, anxiety 
becomes objectified. 
Here, Vigilius may be shifting the meaning of anxiety, for it is not only 
anxiety that becomes objectified, but sinfulness. Thus, when Vigilius writes 
about objective anxiety, he has expanded his notion of anxiety so that he is 
referring to sinful social structures that become objectified as they take root 
and are participated in by people. In different cultures, anxiety becomes 
objectified in different waysl2, which is to say that in different societies, 
sinfulness has different expressions. 
With each successive generation, the quantity of sinfulness and anxiety in 
the world increases. These increases in quantity affect each new innocent 
individual, though they do not qualitatively change the innocent individual.!3 
This means that for each individual, though the person is born into an envi-
ronment with others who are themselves sinners and into a distorted social 
context, it is not the parents, the environment, or the social context alone that 
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causes the innocent person to sin. If the innocent person becomes a sinner, it 
is through a free act. The fact that there is an increased quantity of sin and 
anxiety in the world, which is begun by Adam and is continued by every 
sinner's sin, is not alone what caused the person to sin. The qualitative change 
in the person, the move from innocence to guilt, is a free act of the individual. 
The indivi~ual who is guilty is always, at least in part, responsible for his or 
her sinfulness. 
There are two elements involved when an innocent person becomes guilty. 
On the one hand, there is the fall by the person into sin. On the other hand, 
there is the context in which the fall into sin occurs. "Objective anxiety" is 
Vigilius's term for the increase in sinfulness in the world that is one part of 
the fall into guilt for all individuals subsequent to Adam. 
VI 
The section on subjective anxiety is a continued attempt to show the signifi-
cance of Adam's first sin and to explain some further sense in which sin 
accumulates in the world without making Adam responsible for the sin of any 
subsequent individual. Vigilius explains that while the object of anxiety for 
Adam was the nothingness of the future, for subsequent individuals this future 
nothingness has a more specific form, or as he phrases it, is more of a 
"something" (61). Haufniensis terms this "subjective anxiety" and claims it 
signifies two things (62). 
The first thing that the change in the object of anxiety signifies is the 
consequence of the relationship of generation. Adam's sin (treating Adam 
here as a historical figure) did not take place in a developed social structure, 
or at least not in one that had been distorted by human sinfulness. Yet the 
movement from innocence to guilt that is made by subsequent individuals is 
made in such a distorted social structure. Hence, for subsequent individuals, 
anxiety is in a certain sense more intensified than it was for Adam. For 
example, suppose a person is born into a family and a society with a distorted 
structure. At some point the person may move from innocence to guilt, per-
haps by taking on a distorted role in that social structure. The experience of 
moving from innocence to guilt will be similar to Adam's in that it was done 
by a free act. No science can observe in others what the guilty individual 
knows of himself or herself, i.e., personal responsibility. Like Adam's first 
sin, the movement of the individual from innocence to guilt was made by a 
causally inexplicable leap. However, this person's experience is different 
from Adam's because of the relation to the social setting in which the person 
was placed. The anxiety of this person is different from the anxiety of Adam 
in that the object of anxiety, which is the future possibility of actively taking 
part in this distorted social structure, is more developed than the object of 
anxiety for Adam. 
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To explain this point, Vigilius uses the figure of Eve, since she is derived 
from Adam.14 Unfortunately, his discussion of the role of women is annoy-
ingly sexist to contemporary readers, and even perhaps by 19th century stand-
ards. However, the discussion of the role of women is not the main point; 
instead it is used as an example to explain an important difference between 
Adam's anxiety and the anxiety of subsequent individuals. The difference is 
that for subsequent individuals, anxiety's object, while still a future possibil-
ity, is more concrete, since it is the possibility of actively taking part in a 
distorted social structure that is already in place. The conclusion of this 
section is best summed up when Vigilius writes that "Christianity has never 
assented to giving each particular individual the privilege of starting from 
the beginning in an external sense. Each individual begins in an historical 
nexus" (73). Since every subsequent individual begins in a specific historical 
nexus that is already more or less distorted, the future possibility of actively 
taking part in that social structure is a more concrete possibility than was the 
possibility that Adam faced. This, therefore, is an important difference be-
tween the first sin of Adam and every other sin. Still, this is a quantitative 
difference in anxiety, not a qualitative difference. 15 
The second thing that the change in the object of anxiety signifies is the 
consequence of the historical relationship. The anxiety of the innocent person 
may have various objects, depending on the historical setting in which the 
innocent person has been placed. To explain his point, Vigilius discusses 
sensuality. 
There is nothing intrinsically evil about sensuality; there is nothing wrong 
with being a bodily creature. However, one of the consequences of sin is that 
it makes sensuousness to be sinfulness. (Thus, though Vigilius rejects any 
austere Augustinianism which makes being bodily intrinsically bad, he does 
not replace it with an optimistic Pelagianism.) Sinfulness makes sensuality 
sinfulness. Therefore, there is an important difference between the first sin 
of Adam and the first sin of any subsequent individual regarding their respec-
tive views of sensuality. In the garden and while in innocence, Adam had no 
insight that the body was shameful. It was sin that made sensuousness to be 
sinfulness. However, the situation is different for people in varying historical 
settings. Subsequent individuals have "an historical environment in which it 
may become apparent that sensuousness can signify sinfulness. For the [in-
nocent] individual himself, sensuousness does not signify this, but this knowl-
edge gives anxiety a 'more'" (73). This means that there can be an important 
difference between the anxiety of Adam and the anxiety of subsequent inno-
cent individuals regarding their knowledge of the possibility of transforming 
sensuousness into sinfulness. Further, this intensification in anxiety can vary 
in different societies. For example, the knowledge that an innocent person in 
a Christian society has of the possibility of making sensuousness to be sin-
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fulness might vary from the same knowledge that an innocent person would 
have in a different society (74). Thus, the historical environment in which 
one is placed can make a difference in affecting the intensity of the anxiety. 
Still, this is always a quantitative difference, and it is never enough to make 
an innocent person guilty without some act of personal responsibility on the 
part of the person who becomes gUilty. 
VII 
In summing up chapter two, Vigilius claims that there are three main ways 
of misunderstanding the role that the individual plays in becoming gUilty 
(75-6). The first possible mistake is to view the child as a "perfect little angel" 
who is plunged into a corrupt society. The child is so strongly influenced by 
this distorted environment that, of necessity, the child is made to be bad. But 
this view fails to recognize what the guilty individual alone knows: personal 
responsibility played a role in choosing actively to participate in this distorted 
social setting. Hence, Kierkegaard implicitly rejects Rousseau's view on the 
nature of human beings and the effect of the environment upon them. 
The second possible mistake is to view the child as thoroughly wicked. 
This view fails to recognize the possibility of an innocence that preceded 
wickedness and hence it must place responsibility on something other than 
the guilty individual. Therefore, Kierkegaard rejects an austere Augustinian-
ism or Hobbesian view on the innate wickedness of persons. 
The third possible mistake is to view the child as neither good nor bad 
though capable of each, depending solely on how the child is environmentally 
conditioned. Again, this view ignores any possibility of personal responsibil-
ity. In this way, Kierkegaard implicitly rejects B. F. Skinner's view on the 
role of the environment in conditioning the individual. Vigilius's view-that 
the child is born in innocence but into a sinful society and that, in anxiety, 
the individual freely and inexplicably chooses evil-seeks to avoid the mis-
takes of each of these views by including the middle term: anxiety. 
Therefore, chapter two is important at several levels. Theologically, 
Vigilius shows the sense in which Adam's sin is hereditary. Adam's sin brings 
sin into the world and hence changes the object of anxiety for subsequent 
individuals. This intensification of anxiety in subsequent individuals is "the 
presence of hereditary sin in the single individual" (52). This does not mean 
that anxiety is itself the sin. Vigilius constantly reminds us that the presence 
of this intensified anxiety does not necessitate sin. Thus, hereditary sin is not 
a flaw in one's being caused by Adam's sin, as most earlier interpretations 
had understood it. Rather, hereditary sin consists in the double fact that sin 
and anxiety get objectified in distorted social structures and that the innocent 
individual has a quantitatively increased relation of anxiety to the future 
possibility of actively participating in that distorted society in a distorted way. 
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With this, Vigilius has solved the traditional dilemma ansmg out of the 
Augustinian interpretation of hereditary sin. On Kierkegaard's view, individu-
als are guilty only for their own sinful acts, not for those of previous genera-
tions. Nonetheless, there remains still a sense in which the dogma of 
hereditary sin is true, for there is the double fact that sin and anxiety quan-
titatively accumulate in the world and that this objectification of anxiety in 
the world quantitatively increases anxiety in subsequent individuals. 
At a philosophical and psychological level, chapter two is a defense against 
the charge of radical individualism. Haufniensis makes it clear that individu-
als are always placed in particular environments with unique social settings 
in a specific historical nexus. He wholeheartedly admits that the environment 
conditions the individual, for it intensifies anxiety by giving its object a more 
concrete form, i.e., the possibility of accepting or rejecting the specific dis-
torted social context. This is what Vigilius means when he writes that the 
nothing of anxiety is made into a something (61). Still, the environment does 
not wholly determine how the individual will act. This is what Vigilius means 
when he says that the something is still a nothing (61). The individual has an 
ambiguous relationship to future possibilities, a relationship of both attraction 
and repulsion. Even if the individual has a fairly concrete image of these 
future possibilities, e.g., of either accepting or rejecting the possibility of 
actively taking part in a distorted social structure, the individual is not ne-
cessitated to do either. However, if the individual does make the leap into 
guilt, the condition for the possibility of that leap was anxiety. 
VIII 
Therefore, for Kierkegaard, the concept of anxiety is used to explain and 
rethink both the origin of evil in human life and the hereditariness of that 
evil. Every human being is born in anxious innocence. Like Adam, human 
beings begin life in innocence and are related to future possibilities in anxiety. 
The fall from innocence is the result of a choice made in anxiety. But unlike 
the first inhabitants of Eden, subsequent individuals are born into a world 
changed by sin. In this sense, all subsequent human beings are born "into" 
sin, that is, into a sinful world. Sin is hereditary in the sense that it quantita-
tively accumulates in the world, and as sin and anxiety quantitatively accu-
mulate in the world, the objectification of anxiety quantitatively increases 
anxiety in subsequent individuals. Thus, the hereditariness of sin plays a 
conditioning role, but it is not a necessitating factor causing a qualitative 
change from innocence to guilt. While quantitative changes may alter the 
setting and texture of the first sin of subsequent individuals, it is still the case 
that the qualitative change from innocence to guilt occurs in anxiety, and 
hence remains, in part at least, the responsibility of the individual. 
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